Azaghvana E-Book 2003 - Flipbook - Page 31
2005 and early 2010, I noticed a significant increase in conversion to Islam in Ghwa'a. This
became particularly obvious in the change of the female dress code. I had noticed that
younger women in particular now wore Islamic clothing, which mostly consisted of a full
body gown (called abaya in Arabic) with hijab, sometimes with full face cover (burqa), but
more often with a partial face veil (niqab).
This occurrence was something very new and became particularly obvious when I attended a
funeral in January 2010. We see, in Plate 3a, that the terraced hillside in front of the house of
the old Traditionalist who had died in Ghwa'a was covered with rows of women in their
Islamic dresses, while only a few women danced with leaves over their backs below them.
Also, the number of traditional men in full warrior gear was significantly less in comparison
with funerals that I had seen only a few years earlier. Later, I was able to establish that most
of the recent conversions were to Izala, a version of Islam that had gained popularity in the
towns of the plains. 2 It appears that many of the young seasonal workers were attracted by
this, which also became apparent by the increasing number of marriages celebrated in the hills
to which radical preachers were invited.
A summary of devastation
From mid-2013 onwards, violent attacks on mainly minority Christian communities in the
Gwoza hills began. Houses and churches were burnt and people were killed. These events
were linked to the revival of Boko Haram under a new leader by the name of Abubakar
Shekau and occurred across the northeastern part of Nigeria, in particular Borno and Yobe
state and also in Adamawa state. The attacks intensified and in August that year I was
informed by my friends that Boko Haram had burnt down my research station and that the
first ever state primary school of Ghwa'a had been made into an Islamic school.
The settlements in the eastern plain along the Cameroonian border also came under constant
attack, and streams of refugees leaving their villages developed. By late 2013 and early 2014
the Christian communities, which had been particularly strong in the eastern plains, came
under threat to the degree that more and more people abandoned their homes and fled. The
same happened on the Dghweɗe massif where the Christians had been in a clear minority, and
the few Muslims who remained must have joined or were forced into Boko Haram. At this
point we did not know what happened to our Traditionalist friends, who were mainly elderly
people. We learned only later that they were eventually forced to farm for Boko Haram living
in the hills. Later, I was informed that elderly Traditionalists had been forced to join Boko
Haram for the sake of survival. Also, we were able to establish that those members of Boko
Haram hiding in the hills mostly consisted of those who had fled the plains.
Over the following months the Gwoza hills, in particular Dghweɗe, became one of the main
operational bases of Boko Haram, at least this is what I gathered from friends who had fled.
The Sambesa forest to the west of the Gwoza hills became the most important hiding place of
the group and I was told that one could fairly easily move discreetly from there into the hills.
Throughout that first period of destruction, Gwoza town itself remained under the control of
the Nigerian army, but in May 2014 the emir of Gwoza was killed and abductions of women
and girls started to be reported in the news. Before 2013 some attempts to take back the hills
had still been made by the military, but this had now stopped completely. I remember
speaking regularly to my friends, who had been originally from Barawa in the eastern plain
but had fled to safer places, first to Mubi and later to Abuja. They updated me on what they
2
For a better understanding of the history between Izala and the Boko Haram doctrine I recommend
Adam Higazi (2015), who also did extensive research on the insurgency in the Gwoza area. He writes
(ibid:324): 'Izala are strongly against Boko Haram and in that respect they are a bulwark against the
jihadists, in Nigeria and Niger. But their Salafist message increased discord and religious competition
in northern Nigeria, particularly with the Tijaniyya Sufi order and local Christians. This contributed to
the rise of Boko Haram, which developed its own ideology but started as a splinter group from Izala.'
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